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ATKINS v. VIRGINIA: COMMUTATION FOR
THE MENTALLY RETARDED?
I. INTRODUCTION
In Atkins v. Virginia1 the United States Supreme Court held that
the imposition of the death penalty upon mentally retarded criminal
defendants violated the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the
Eighth Amendment' and, therefore, was unconstitutional.3 This
decision left the states with the burden of implementing guidelines
consistent with the Court's holding.4 Currently, South Carolina does
not prohibit the execution of the mentally retarded.5 Consequently,
existing law is unconstitutional and will need to be amended to
comply with the Court's ruling.
This Comment examines certain changes in Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence concerning capital defendants, particularly some of the
problems associated with the response required by the states after
Atkins. Further, this Comment proposes guidelines consistent with the
Court's decision for implementation in South Carolina. Part II briefly
traces the recent development of procedural and substantive
limitations the Eighth Amendment6 imposes on the use of capital
punishment. Part III discusses Atkins and its significance on national
1. 122 S. Ct. 2242 (2002).
2. The United States Constitution provides that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (emphasis added). The South Carolina Constitution contains
a similar provision: "[N]or shall cruel, nor corporal, nor unusual punishment be
inflicted.... S.C. CONST. art. I, § 15.
3. 122 S. Ct. at 2252.
4. Id. at 2250. Justice Stevens remarked: "[W]e leave to the State[s] the task of
developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon its
execution of sentences." Id. (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405,416-17
(1986)).
5. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C)(b)(10) (Law. Co-op. 2001) (treating mental
retardation only as a mitigating factor during sentencing).
6. Other limitations, such as due process requirements, although important, are
not the primary focus of this Comment. Notably, two different federal district judges
recently declared the federal death penalty statute unconstitutional based on due
process violations, rather than the Eighth Amendment's bar against cruel and unusual
punishment. See United States v. Fell, 217 F. Supp. 2d 469, 489 (D. Vt. 2002)
(invalidating the federal death penalty statute on both the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment and the Confrontation and Cross Examination Clauses of the Sixth
Amendment); United States v. Quinones, 205 F. Supp. 2d 256, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 2002),
rev'd, 313 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 2002).
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and South Carolina death penalty jurisprudence. Part IV describes the
current law in South Carolina, poses issues raised by the Atkins
mandate, and identifies and comments on minimum due process
requirements and discretionary options available to the states. Finally,
Part V contains a set of proposed guidelines in response to these
discretionary issues.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Capital Punishment in the United States
State-sanctioned executions have been "employed throughout our
history," and the Supreme Court has remarked that they do not
"violate the constitutional concept of cruelty."7 Although states are
allowed significant leeway in developing and administering criminal
punishment schemes,' the Supreme Court has decided that
constitutional implications of the Eighth Amendment on death penalty
jurisprudence authorize the Court to reach decisions concerning the
application and scope of the death penalty.9
For most of the United States' history, the Supreme Court
assumed a limited role when it visited the states' use of capital
punishment." Then, in 1972, the Court in Furman v. Georgia"
invalidated the use of the death penalty as it was then applied by the
states. No single rationale in support of invalidation could be
delineated from the Court's plurality opinion." However, four years
later, the Court reexamined application of the death penalty and
upheld its use. 3 In relying principally upon three factors, the Court
noted the following unique aspects of the death penalty: 1) its
7. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99 (1958); see also Ken Driggs, A Current of
Electricity Sufficient in Intensity to Cause Immediate Death: A Pre-History of
Florida's Electric Chair, 22 STETSON L. REv. 1169, 1169 (1993) (noting that more
than 18,000 people were executed in the United States between Colonial times and
1992).
8. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 319 (1987) ("It is not the
responsibility-or indeed even the right-of this Court to determine the appropriate
punishment for particular crimes. It is the legislatures, the elected representatives of
the people, that are 'constituted to respond to the will and consequently the moral
values of the people."') (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 383 (1972)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting)).
9. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910).
10. See Trop, 356 U.S. at 99.
11. 408 U.S. at 239-40 (holding unconstitutional the then-existing statutory
death penalty schemes as violative of both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments).
12. Each of the Justices wrote a separate opinion, and only one paragraph within
the decision was agreed upon by a five-justice majority. Id.
13. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 207 (1976) (plurality opinion) (White, J.,
concurring).
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traditional use as punishment for the crime of murder;1 4 2) its
popularity as a criminal sanction;"5 and 3) its contribution in
addressing the social goals of retribution and deterrence. 6
Nevertheless, because the Eighth Amendment requires heightened
procedural protections to ensure that the substantive limitations are
met, the death penalty "could not be imposed under sentencing
procedures that created a substantial risk that it would be inflicted in
an arbitrary and capricious manner."' 7
B. Death is Different
In interpreting if a particular punishment should be
constitutionally foreclosed as an option, the Court has adopted two
primary approaches to assist in its analysis. First, a punishment may
be cruel and unusual if it was considered such at the time the Framers
adopted the Bill of Rights in 1791.18 However, it is unclear how the
Framers viewed the meaning of "cruel and unusual"; it is suggested
that modes of punishment commonly carried out during that earlier
time were acceptable, and all others were cruel and unusual and thus
prohibited.'9 In addition to its traditional use, the Court considers the
evolutionary character of punishment.2" In deciding if a punishment is
now cruel and unusual, the Court generally looks toward legislative
action" prohibiting certain punishments in order to conclude that the
practice now violates "evolving standards of decency."22 Intertwined
with these two approaches is the Court's proportionality review of
punishments.23 The Court has stated that any mode of punishment used
14. Id. at 176.
15. Id. at 179 (noting that "it is now evident that a large proportion of American
society continues to regard [the death penalty] as an appropriate and necessary
criminal sanction").
16. Id. at 183.
17. Id. at 188.
18. 122 S. Ct. 2242, 2260 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Ford v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,405) (1986). The Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause was borrowed verbatim from the English Bill of Rights of 1689.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 242 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring).
19. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 319, 368 (1910) (remarking that "[o]ther
cases have selected certain tyrannical acts of the English monarchs as illustrating the
meaning of the [Cruel and Unusual Punishments] clause and the extent of its
prohibition").
20. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
21. Atkins, 122 S. Ct. at 2247; Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989).
22. Trop, 356 U.S. at 101 (holding that the scope of the Eighth Amendment
"must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society").
23. 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (plurality opinion) (Stewart, J., concurring).
2003]
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"must not be grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime, '24
and must be "directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal
offender."2
Nevertheless, the use of capital punishment may be eroding to the
point that interpretation of the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause eventually may be rendered obsolete.
Although Gregg v. Georgia held that the death penalty is not per se
unconstitutional,26 courts have repeatedly remarked that "death is
different"27 and, subsequently, have placed significant procedural and
substantive safeguards on capital trials.2" As such, interpretation and
application of the Eighth Amendment have not been static.
Since the Court first struck down the states' death penalty
schemes in 1972, the Court has placed numerous limitations on capital
trials based on procedural grounds. For instance, the Court has
remarked that the death penalty "could not be imposed under
sentencing procedures that created a substantial risk that it would be
inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner,"2 9 but instead should
be imposed consistently and fairly."a When the Court constitutionally
restored the death penalty in 1976,"1 it upheld the use of a "bifurcated"
system to determine separately the issues of culpability and
sentencing32 and provided that a trier of fact must consider the
character of the defendant and the circumstances of the crime when
deciding whether to impose the death penalty.33 Also, the Court has
mandated that triers of fact consider relevant mitigating factors,
particularly any "compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from
the diverse frailties of humankind" to promote "individualized
24. Id.
25. Penry, 492 U.S. at 336 (citing Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987)).
26. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 177-78.
27. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357 (1977) ("[D]eath is a different kind
of punishment from any other which may be imposed in this country."); see also
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring) (remarking that
death is unique in, among other things, its "total irrevocability," and its "rejection of
rehabilitation").
28. See generally Margaret Jane Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respect for
Persons: Super Due Process for Death, 53 S. CAL. L. REv. 1143, 1149-55 (1980)
(discussing the Court's procedural application of the death penalty). Contra Callins
v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1144 (1994) (mem. denying certiorari) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (stating that the death penalty is "fraught with arbitrariness,
discrimination, caprice, and mistake" despite implementation of procedural
safeguards).
29. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188.
30. Id. at 195.
31. Id. at 207.
32. Id. at 195 (remarking that a bifurcated system sufficiently reduces the
arbitrary and capricious application of the death penalty).
33. Idat 189, 195.
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sentencing" among offenders.34 In 1978, the Court broadened the
"individualized offender" concept by requiring that states permit
defendants to submit for consideration all evidence that may mitigate
against a death sentence to avoid "the risk that the death penalty will
be imposed in spite of factors which may call for a less severe
penalty."3 The Lockett v. Ohio Court defined a mitigating factor as
"any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the
circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for
a sentence less than death. 36 Then, in 1989, the Court held that a jury
must have the opportunity to consider mental retardation as a specific
mitigating factor.37
The heart of the Eighth Amendment also includes permissible
substantive limitations, and the Court has responded by narrowing the
class of individuals who are eligible for the death penalty. For
example, some punishments cannot be inflicted regardless of the
heinous nature of the crime committed. In addition, the Court
requires the existence of aggravating factors to justify "the imposition
of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found
guilty of murder."39
Moreover, after the Court sustained the use of capital punishment
in 1976,40 the Court immediately began adopting categorical
exclusions from application of the death penalty. For instance, the
death penalty is inappropriate for certain crimes," leaving the crime
34. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (plurality opinion).
35. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (plurality opinion).
36. Id. at 604.
37. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989). Despite a conservative
majority now sitting on the Court, recent decisions have continued to add a plethora
of procedural protections as required by other constitutional provisions. See, e.g.,
Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct. 2428,2443 (2002) (holding that the constitutional stricture
of the right to a trial by jury leaves the factfinder with the decision of determining
whether aggravating factors exist in favor of the death penalty); Shafer v. South
Carolina, 532 U.S. 36, 51 (2001) (concluding that due process constraints require that
ajury be informed that the defendant is ineligible for parole in cases in which the only
alternative to a death sentence is life without parole). In South Carolina, this latter
decision has since been codified. See 2002 S.C. Acts 278.
38. See, e.g., Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 319, 370 (1910) (suggesting in
dictum that some forms of punishment, such as disemboweling alive or beheading and
quartering, constitute cruel and unusual punishment).
39. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983); see also S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-
3-20(C)(a)(1)-(1 1) (Law. Co-op. 2001) (listing specific aggravating circumstances,
at least one of which must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt before a death
sentence may be imposed).
40. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 207.
41. See, e.g., Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788 (1982) (concluding that the
imposition of the death penalty on a non-participant in a felony murder is cruel and
unusual punishment), modified, Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987) (holding
that the death penalty was not cruel and unusual in cases involving "major
2003]
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of murder as the traditional death-eligible crime.4 2 In addition, states
cannot enact mandatory death sentencing schemes43 or impose the
death penalty upon defendants younger than age sixteen." The Court
has also abolished the imposition of the death penalty upon insane
persons45 because of the "natural abhorrence civilized societies feel at
killing one who has no capacity to come to grips with his own
conscience or deity."" The Court in Atkins v. Virginia created yet
another categorical exemption when it shifted mental retardation from
a mitigating factor that juries were required to consider to an absolute
exclusion. 47 However, before detailing this shift, a discussion of
background information on a defendant's mental status is necessary.
C. Mental Status and the Death Penalty
Historically, criminal defendants who suffer from varying degrees
of mental degradation have enjoyed special status under the law. For
instance, "lunatics" and "idiots ' 48 were excluded from the death
penalty or from responsibility for the crime itself,49 and tests were
participation in the felony committed, combined with reckless indifference to human
life"); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion) (holding as
cruel and unusual punishment the imposition of the death penalty for the crime of rape
of an adult woman).
42. Murder is the only crime under South Carolina law that is eligible for the
death penalty, see S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(A) (Law. Co-op. 1976), and is defined
as the "killing of any person with malice aforethought, either express or implied." S.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-3-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976). But see State v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063,
1073 (La. 1996) (upholding as constitutional a statute that provides for the imposition
of the death penalty on an individual convicted of raping a child less than twelve years
of age), cert. denied sub nom. Bethley v. Louisiana, 520 U.S. 1259 (1997).
43. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 336 (i976).
44. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988) (plurality opinion); cf.
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369-73 (1989) (holding that the execution of
defendants ages sixteen and seventeen is not cruel and unusual and does not violate
"evolving standards of decency"). The United States Supreme Court, in a 5-4
decision, recently denied a writ of habeas corpus to enjoin the execution of a
defendant who was under the age of eighteen at the time he committed the offense.
In re Stanford, 123 S. Ct. 472 (2002). The South Carolina Supreme Court has upheld
the imposition of the death penalty upon a defendant who was sixteen at the time the
crime was committed. State v. Conyers, 326 S.C. 263, 266, 487 S.E.2d 181, 183
(1997).
45. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,416 (1986); see also S.C. CODEANN.
§ 17-24-10 (Law. Co-op. 2001) (prohibiting execution of persons who are insane at
the time of commission of the crime).
46. Ford, 477 U.S. at 409.
47. 122 S. Ct. 2242, 2251 (2002).
48. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331-32 (defining "idiot" as one "who had
a total lack of reason or understanding, or an inability to distinguish between good and
evil").
49. Id. at 331.
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developed over time to distinguish them from "normal" people.50
Previously, people falling into either of these two common law
categories were likely to be classified as either "profoundly" or
"severely" retarded pursuant to the American Association on Mental
Retardation's (AAMR) degree classification"' and, accordingly, were
exempt from capital punishment.52 The AAMR no longer adheres to
this system of classification, and individuals falling below the
threshold of mental retardation are simply considered mentally
retarded. 53
Despite special treatment of defendants suffering from mental
infirmities, in 1989, the Court refused to recognize mental retardation
as a categorical exclusion and held that such executions were not
unconstitutional because a "national consensus" had not yet evolved
against them.54 The Court contended that legislation is the primary
source to which it looks to determine whether a practice is cruel and
unusual and, at the time, only two states, Georgia and Maryland, had
enacted provisions prohibiting the execution of the mentally retarded.55
The Court also noted that although "severely" or "profoundly"
mentally retarded individuals may be completely relieved from
criminal responsibility,56 not all who suffer from mental retardation
lack the "cognitive, volitional, and moral capacity to act with the
degree of culpability associated with the death penalty."" Although
the Court did not create a new categorical exemption, it nevertheless
required that a jury be allowed to "consider and give effect to any
mitigating evidence relevant to a defendant's background and
character or the circumstances of the crime,"" which must include
evidence of mental retardation to ensure the death penalty is "the
appropriate punishment in a specific case." 59
50. Atkins, 122 S. Ct. at 2260 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting tests that included
an individual counting "twenty pence" or identifying his mother or father).
51. Penry, 492 U.S. at 333.
52. Id. at 331.
53. Brief of the American Association on Mental Retardation et al. as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 14 n. 18, McCarver v. North Carolina, cert. granted
532 U.S. 941 (2001), and cert. dismissed 533 U.S. 975 (2001) (No. 00-8727).
54. Penry, 492 U.S. at 340. Notably, Penry received his third death sentence in
July 2002, despite the introduction of evidence showing mental retardation. John
Council, The Penry Predicament: How Should Texas Handle Mental Retardation
Claims in Capital Cases?, TEX. LAW., July 15, 2002, at WL 7/15/2002 Legal
Intelligencer 1.
55. Penry, 492 U.S. at 334.
56. Id. at 337.
57. Id. at 338.
58. Id. at 328.
59. Id. (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976)).
2003]
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III. ATKINS V. VIRGINIA
Since the Court's decision inPenry v. Lynaugh, sixteen additional
states60 have enacted legislation barring the execution of the mentally
retarded. With this legislative backdrop, in March 2001 the Supreme
Court granted certiorari in a North Carolina case to determine the
constitutionality of executing the mentally retarded.61 However, the
Court dismissed the case as moot62 after North Carolina joined a
rapidly-growing number of jurisdictions barring the execution of the
mentally retarded.63 Nevertheless, consideration of the issue became
ripe once again in a Virginia case, and the Court granted certiorari to
consider Atkins v. Virginia.64
A. Facts
Daryl Atkins was sentenced to death for the 1996 abduction and
murder of Eric Nesbitt.6s After spending the day drinking alcohol and
smoking marijuana, Atkins and a co-defendant abducted Nesbitt from
a convenience store and forced him to withdraw money from an
automated teller machine.6 Atkins then shot Nesbitt eight times,
killing him.67 As part of a plea agreement to avoid the death penalty,
Atkins' co-defendant testified that Atkins was the triggerman.68
During the first penalty phase, Dr. Nelson, a forensic
psychologist, testified on behalf of the defense that Atkins was "mildly
mentally retarded," basing his opinion upon interviews with people
who knew Atkins, a review of school and court records, and
administration of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scales test.69 The
test indicated that Atkins possessed an IQ score of fifty-nine.70 The
defense expert concluded that Atkins' score placed him in the less than
one percentile of the general population, making him eligible to
receive Social Security disability income.7 He further stated that the
60. Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 2248 (2002) (citations omitted).
61. McCarver v. North Carolina, 532 U.S. 941 (2001) (mem.).
62. McCarver v. North Carolina, 533 U.S. 975 (2001) (mem.).
63. 2001 N.C. Sess. Laws 346.
64. 533 U.S. 976 (2001) (mem.), amended by 534 U.S. 809 (2001) (mem.).
65. Atkins, 122 S. Ct. at 2244. Atkins' first death sentence was overturned in
1999 because of a defective jury verdict form, but a second jury subsequently
sentenced him to death. Id. at 2259 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 2244.
67. Id.
68. Id. n.1.
69. Id. at 2245.
70. Atkins, 122 S. Ct. at 2245.
71. Id. at 2245 n.5.
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score was not an "aberration, malingered result, or invalid test
score."
72
Dr. Nelson testified again for the defense during the second
penalty phase.73 However, the prosecution offered a rebuttal witness,
Dr. Samenow, who testified that Atkins was not mentally retarded and
concluded that Atkins possessed "average intelligence, at least" and
suffered from antisocial personality disorder. 4 His opinion was based
on two interviews with Atkins, interviews with correctional staff, and
a review of school records." Although he did not administer an IQ
test, he did pose questions from the 1972 version of the Wechsler
Memory Scale.76 Dr. Samenow blamed Atkins' poor academic record
on Atkins' willful refusal to perform in school.77
B. Reasoning
Overruling Penry v. Lynaugh's holding from just thirteen years
ago,78 Justice Stevens, writing for the 6-3 majority, held that the
imposition of the death penalty upon mentally retarded defendants
violated the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the United
States Constitution and, therefore, was unconstitutional.7 9 In rejecting
the "right and wrong" standard,80 the majority created a new
categorical exemption to the death penalty.8
The Court principally based its reasoning on an emerging
legislative trend of prohibitions against such executions.82 The
legislative action by sixteen additional states8 3 since the Court's
decision in Penry,84 as well as the United States' increasingly isolated
position toward the use of the death penalty in these situations,85
reflected the "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of
72. Id.
73. Id. at 2246.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 2246 n.6.
76. Atkins, 122 S. Ct. at 2246 n.6.
77. Id.
78. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
79. Atkins, 122 S. Ct. at 2252.
80. Id. at 2250 (noting defendants with mental retardation "frequently know the
difference between right and wrong and are competent to stand trial").
81. Id. at 2251.
82. Id. at 2248-50.
83. Id. at 2248-49.
84. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
85. Atkins, 122 S. Ct. at 2250 n.21.
2003]
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a maturing society" against such executions.8 6 Because of the
numerous legislative prohibitions, especially in light of the well-
known popularity of anticrime legislation, the Court held execution of
the mentally retarded "truly unusual.""7 The Court reinforced its
decision by citing public opinion polls and amici briefs from groups
such as the American Psychological Association, the United States
Catholic Conference, and other groups that expressed moral sentiment
against executing the mentally retarded."8 The Court noted the "world
community" overwhelmingly disfavored such practices.8 9
The Court also included other reasons why such executions should
be barred. First, it stated that the mentally retarded do not act with the
same level of "moral culpability" because of their inability to control
their reasoning, judgment, or impulses. 90 The Court explained that two
objectives of the death penalty-retribution and deterrence--do not
apply to individuals with diminished intellectual functioning.9" The
retributive aspect of the death penalty, which is ensuring that "only the
most deserving of execution are put to death,"92 is not served when the
individual suffers from diminished culpability because an individual
receiving "just deserts" depends on his level of culpability.93 Also, the
deterrence goal is not furthered because individuals who lack the
cognitive capacity to develop the "cold calculus that precedes the
decision" of premeditated murder will not be sufficiently able to alter
their conduct in order to conform their behavior to the law.94
Further, the Court noted that a mentally retarded defendant's
"reduced capacity" 95 may leave the defendant vulnerable to "false
confessions" '96 or to the death penalty being imposed in spite of
evidence of mental retardation.97 A jury may be inclined to impose the
death penalty because of the defendant's mental status. Justice Stevens
referred to this possibility as a "two-edged sword," resulting from the
inappropriate effect caused by a defendant's smiling or perceived lack
of remorse while in the presence of the jurors or by a supposed threat
86. Id. at 2247 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958)). Justice
Stevens noted that it was "not so much the number of these States that is significant,
but the consistency of the direction of change." Id. at 2249 (emphasis added).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 2249 n.21.
89. Id. at 2250 n.2 1.
90. Atkins, 122 S. Ct. at 2244.
91. Id. at 2252.
92. Id. at 2251.
93. Id.
94. Id. (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 186 (1976)).
95. Id. at 2251.
96. Atkins, 122 S. Ct. at 2252.
97. Id. at 2251.
10
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of future danger.9" Also, the Court stated that a defendant's disabled
communication with counsel would impede the adequacy and quality
of representation.99
Relying on deference to statutory schemes barring the execution
of the mentally retarded, along with the inability of such practices to
fulfill the goals of retribution and deterrence, the Court held such
executions to be "excessive" and, therefore, violative of the Eighth
Amendment.' 0 The Court reversed Atkins' death sentence and
remanded the case to the state court for re-sentencing in light of its
opinion.' °'
C. Dissenting Opinions
Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented in a separate opinion, in which
Justice Scalia joined, challenging the majority's reliance on
international laws and opinion.0 2 He criticized the use of polling data
and stated that the majority was "seriously mistaken" in its reliance on
foreign laws and views of religious and professional organizations.' 3
Justice Scalia, in an opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Thomas joined,0 4 also rejected the Court's reliance on public
opinion polls'0 5 and its holding founded upon deference to national"°
and international consensus. 0 7 He stated that the majority was
allowing its personal views to be substituted for the popular will of the
states as evidenced by legislation rejecting an exemption for the
mentally retarded.'0 8 Justice Scalia questioned the majority's "trend"
analysis because twenty of the thirty-eight death penalty states
continued to allow the execution of the mentally retarded.'09 Further,
he cautioned that once the Court took the step in prohibiting the
execution of the mentally retarded, the states were "locked in" and
98. Id. at 2252.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Atkins, 122 S. Ct. at 2252.
103. Id. at2256.
104. Id. at 2259. Disagreeing vehemently with the majority, Justice Scalia also
read a summary of his opinion from the bench. Jeff Blumenthal et al., Death Penalty
Ruling Nets Varied Reactions, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, June 21, 2002, at WL
7/15/2002 Legal Intelligencer 1.
105. Atkins, 122 S. Ct. at 2264.
106. Id. at2261.
107. Id. at 2264.
108. Id. at 2259.
109. Id. at 2261.
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there could be no turning back in finding such executions
constitutional.' 10
D. Significance of Atkins
1. Generally
In creating another categorical exclusion from capital punishment,
Atkins mandates that a defendant may not be sentenced to death if he
or she meets the prosecuting state's definition of mentally retarded.'
As a result, executions of some inmates may be delayed, and other
inmates will no longer face the death penalty at all.
Since 1976, more than 800 inmates have been executed in the
United States," 2 and it is estimated that as many as forty-four of those
were mentally retarded." 3 The number of inmates currently serving on
death row who can plausibly claim mental retardation may be quite
large. Empirical studies suggest that as many as three percent of the
population at large may suffer from mental retardation,' "' although that
number within the criminal population may be significantly higher." 5
Currently, more than 3,700 inmates are awaiting execution in the
United States," 6 and as many as 200 of them may suffer from mental
retardation." 7
Although not explicit, the Atkins opinion appears to apply
retroactively. "' The decision has already demonstrated repercussions
110. Id. at 2263.
111. Atkins, 122 S. Ct. at 2252.
112. Death Penalty Information Center, Number of Executions by State Since
1976, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/dpicreg.html (last updated Oct. 9, 2002)
[hereinafter DPIC, Number of Executions].
113. National Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty, Offending Justice, at
http://www.ncadp.org/html/fact6.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2002).
114. See Brief of American Psychological Association, et al. as Amici Curiae
in Support of Petitioner at 7, McCarver v. North Carolina, cert. granted 532 U.S. 941
(2001), and cert. dismissed 533 U.S. 975 (2001) (No. 00-8727).
115. American Association on Mental Retardation, Fact Sheet: The Death
Penalty, at http://www.aamr.org/Policies/faq_death penalty.shtml (last updated Mar.
6,2001).
116. Death Penalty Information Center, Death Row Inmates by State, at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/DRowlnfo.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2002)
[hereinafter DPIC, Death Row Statistics].
117. Timothy P. Oneill, Miranda's Illusion of Fairness to Mentally Retarded,
CHI. DAILY L. BULL., July 12, 2002, at 5.
118. During oral arguments of Atkins, a Supreme Court Justice remarked that
"[m]aybe the States that haven't made [prohibition against executing the mentally
retarded] retroactive haven't gotten up to speed on that once it's -- once we make a
declaration of unconstitutionality, it's retrospective." See United States Supreme
Court Official Transcript at 42, Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242 (2002) (No. 00-
8452).
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around the country as several executions have been stayed in cases
where the inmates raised an Atkins claim.1 9 The Supreme Court's
decision opened a new avenue of appeal, and, in those states that
currently do not bar the execution of the mentally retarded, it will
likely spur a significant number of death row inmates to claim mental
retardation in order to avoid the death penalty. Inmates are likely to
raise claims even if no mental retardation issue was raised in the trial
proceedings.
Further, capital defense attorneys at both the trial and appellate
levels may raise the issue to protect themselves from disciplinary or
malpractice actions. Also, inmates currently awaiting a death penalty
trial will probably raise a mental retardation claim to avoid a death
sentence and, in some cases, may actually feign mental retardation.
However, the American Psychiatric Association argues that successful
false claims are unlikely because diagnosis requires onset during the
developmental period. 2 Nevertheless, the fallout from Atkins likely
will result in a flood of appeals and trial claims, overburdening and
clogging trial and appellate court dockets as courts attempt to process
the huge number of appeals.
2. South Carolina
The Atkins decision named South Carolina as one of five states
that have carried out executions of the mentally retarded since the
Court's Penry v. Lynaugh' decision.'22 Current South Carolina law
treats mental retardation that existed at the time of the crime as merely
a mitigating factor; 23 such an approach is clearly unconstitutional after
Atkins. The substantive and procedural aspects of the decision need to
be addressed by the South Carolina General Assembly to guarantee
that adequate and sufficient safeguards and procedures are put in place
to ensure a mentally retarded defendant is not eligible for the death
penalty.
The aftermath of Atkins has already been demonstrated in South
Carolina. Since the United States Supreme Court first agreed, in 2001,
to reconsider executing the mentally retarded,'24 the South Carolina
119. After making an Atkins 'claim, a Texas inmate's execution was stayed less
than four hours before his scheduled execution. Mary Alice Robbins, Some Say Flood
ofAtkins' Claims Will Slow Executions, TEx. LAW., July 22, 2002, at WL 7/15/2002
Legal Intelligencer 1.
120. Brief of American Psychological Association, et al. at 18, McCarver (No.
00-8727).
121. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
122. Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 2249 n.20 (2002).
123. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C)(b)(1 0) (2001).
124. See McCarver v. North Carolina, 532 U.S. 941 (2001) (mem.).
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Supreme Court has stayed or continued several capital cases pending
decision on the issue.125 On July 17,2002, attorneys for seven inmates
who either have been sentenced to death or are currently awaiting a
death penalty trial filed a petition with the South Carolina Supreme
Court, requesting the court to review these cases and to establish
substantive and procedural guidelines on the definition of mental
retardation and how it is to be determined. 26 On September 19, 2002,
the South Carolina Supreme Court granted certiorari,'2 7 and a response
by that court is still pending. Interestingly, on December 4, 2002,
several members of the South Carolina House of Representatives
introduced a bill that would prohibit execution of the mentally retarded
and would establish certain procedures.'28
The Atkins opinion has particular salience on South Carolina's
application of the death penalty. Since 1976, South Carolina has
executed twenty-eight people,'29 and several of those executed
allegedly suffered from mental retardation. 3 ' Currently, seventy-seven
people are awaiting execution in South Carolina.'3
Additionally, the Court noted in Atkins that the existence of
retardation may be used as a "two-edged sword"'3 because a jury,
instead of viewing retardation as a mitigating factor, may treat it as an
aggravating one and impose the death penalty nevertheless because it
considers a mentally retarded individual a future danger to society."'
In his dissent in Penry v. Lynaugh, Justice Brennan noted such a
perspective when he quoted a South Carolina newspaper: "[T]here is
125. For example, the South Carolina Supreme Court granted capital defendant
Johnny Ringo Pearson's motion to continue his trial pending the United States
Supreme Court's review of the constitutionality of executing the mentally retarded.
Pearson v. State, No. ___ (S.C. Apr. 16, 2001) (order granting motion to stay) (on
file with the Clerk of Court for the South Carolina Supreme Court).
126. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Franklin v. Maynard, No. _ (S.C.
cert. granted Sept. 19, 2002) (on file with the Clerk of Court for the South Carolina
Supreme Court).
127. Franklin v. Maynard, No. _ (S.C. Sept. 19, 2002) (order granting
petition for writ of certiorari) (on file with the Clerk of Court for the South Carolina
Supreme Court).
128. H.R. 3165, Gen. Assem., 115th Sess. (S.C. 2003),
http://www.scstatehouse.net/sess115_2003-2004/bills/3165.htm. For a detailed
discussion, see infra notes 215-20 and accompanying text.
129. DPIC, Number of Executions, supra note 112.
130. See, e.g., State v. Middleton, 295 S.C. 318, 326, 368 S.E.2d 457, 461
(1988) (defendant introduced evidence showing borderline mental retardation with an
IQ of sixty-eight). Frank Middleton, Jr., was executed in 1996. Death Penalty
Information Center, Executions in the U.S.: 1996, at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/dpicexec96.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2002).
131. DPIC, Death Row Statistics, supra note 116.
132. 122 S. Ct. 2242, 2252 (2002).
133. Id. at 2251.
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all the more reason to execute a killer if he is also.., retarded. Killers
often kill again; [a] retarded killer is more to be feared than a...
normal killer." '134
Most importantly, the Court's decision seriously questions the
viability of South Carolina's "guilty but mentally ill" statute.' The
"guilty but mentally ill" statute is an alternative to the traditional "not
guilty by reason of insanity" defense, because a jury can choose to
reject a defendant's absolute exculpation for his criminal acts despite
a showing of mental illness.'36 A defendant found to be guilty but
mentally ill, unlike one who is found to be insane, is still eligible for
the death penalty; as such, not much difference exists in effect
between a guilty verdict and a guilty but mentally ill verdict.'37 The
South Carolina Supreme Court has continually upheld the
constitutionality of this provision.13 However, the court may be
signaling a re-thinking in this area in that it recently agreed to rehear
an earlier decision upholding the death penalty of a mentally ill
person. 139 It may be argued that the moral culpability reasoning relied
134. 492 U.S. 302,347 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Upholding Law
and Order, HARTSVILLE MESSENGER (S.C.), June 24, 1987, at 5B).
135. The "Guilty But Mentally Ill" statute provides, in part:
A defendant is guilty but mentally ill if, at the time of the
commission of the act constituting the offense, he had the
capacity to distinguish right from wrong to recognize his act as
being wrong ... but because of mental disease or defect he
lacked sufficient capacity to conform his conduct to the
requirements of the law.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-20(A) (Law Co-op. 1976).
136. See id.
137. A defendant found guilty but mentally ill and sentenced to prison time is
transferred to a mental health treatment facility until facility staff determine the
defendant can be safely integrated into the general prison population. S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 17-24-70(A) (Law Co-op. 1976).
138. See State v. Hornsby, 326 S.C. 121, 126, 484 S.E.2d 869, 872 (1997)
(holding that the statute did not violate the defendant's due process rights because the
statute was rationally related to the state's goal of "reduc[ing] the number of
defendants being completely relieved of criminal responsibility," while ensuring that
mentally ill defendants received proper mental health care); see also State v. Wilson,
306 S.C. 498, 512, 514,413 S.E.2d 19, 27, 28 (1992) (upholding the statute on federal
and state constitutional grounds despite the fact that a defendant may lack the capacity
to conform his behavior in order to comply with the law), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 846
(1992). However, a dissenter in Wilson noted that "[t]he natural abhorrence civilized
societies feel at killing one who has no capacity to come to grips with his own
conscience or deity is still valid today." Id. at 517, 413 S.E.2d at 30 (Finney, J.,
dissenting).
139. State v. Weik, No. 25526,2002 S.C. LEXIS 159 (S.C. Sept. 3,2002), reh "g
granted, 2002 S.C. LEXIS 197 (S.C. Oct. 10, 2002). In Weik the court had found that,
although it is unconstitutional to impose the death penalty upon a mentally retarded
person in light of Atkins, "the imposition of such a sentence upon a mentally ill person
is not disproportionate." Id. at * 13 (citation omitted).
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upon by the Atkins Court as a basis for prohibiting the execution of
those suffering from diminished culpability would also hold true in the
case of a mentally ill defendant.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION OF A TKINS IN SOUTH CAROLINA
A. Current Law in South Carolina
Currently, South Carolina law does not prohibit the execution of
the mentally retarded.""0 Three years after the Penry v. Lynaugh
Court's decision to uphold such executions, 4' South Carolina
amended its death penalty statute to provide that a jury may consider
mental retardation that existed at the time of the crime as merely a
mitigating factor for assessing whether to impose the death penalty.'42
The statute defines "mental retardation" as "significantly subaverage
general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in
adaptive behavior and manifested during the developmental period."
43
The statute neither offers a numerical IQ level nor defines "adaptive
behavior."
South Carolina law provides for certain mitigating factors,
including mental retardation, which are authorized by statute.'" If a
statutory mitigating factor, or any other factor authorized by law, is
supported by the evidence, statutory instructions must be charged to
the jury in writing for use during its deliberations.'45 No "articulated
burden" is imposed upon the defendant to prove evidence of
mitigating factors.'"
After the trial court has initially found evidence to support a
finding of mitigation, the defendant may waive the presentation of
those factors he wishes the jury not to consider, or he may request the
submission of additional statutory mitigating factors supported by the
140. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C)(b)(10) (2001).
141. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
142. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C)(b)(I0) (2001).
143. Id. (emphasis added). This definition is consistent with the definition of
mental retardation in other South Carolina statutes; see, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-20-
30(11) (Law. Co-op. 2002) (including the mentally retarded as eligible to receive
certain disability services); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-26-10(11) (Law. Co-op. 2002)
(providing for certain rights on behalf of the mentally retarded).
144. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C)(b)(1)-(10) (Law. Co-op. 2002).
145. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C) (Law Co-op. 2001).
146. State v. Patrick, 289 S.C. 301, 308, 345 S.E.2d 481, 485 (1986), rev'd on
other grounds, Casey v. State, 305 S.C. 445,447 n.2, 409 S.E.2d 391, 392 n.2 (1991).
Upon reviewing the record, the trial judge is under a duty to submit supported
mitigating evidence, even if the defense counsel fails to do so. State v. Young, 305
S.C. 380, 386, 409 S.E.2d 352, 356 (1991).
16
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 54, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 9
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol54/iss3/9
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
evidence.'47 The finding of mitigation by the jury does not need to be
unanimous, 48 and the jury is authorized to impose life even without
a finding of mitigation.149 Instructions are not required to charge the
jury to "weigh" the aggravating circumstances against any mitigating
factors.'°
Consequently, under current South Carolina law, a mentally
retarded defendant could receive the death penalty if any of the listed,
statutory aggravating factors are found, and the mental retardation
issue is appropriately considered by the trier of fact.
B. Issues Raised by Atkins
In light ofAtkins prosecutors will likely not seek the death penalty
in cases where strong evidence of mental retardation is presented.
Those individuals falling within the borderline of retardation will be
the most difficult to decide, and a finding of mental retardation will
likely turn on the state's definition of mental retardation.
1. Definition of "Mental Retardation"
The Supreme Court in Atkins left it up to the states to formulate
their own definition of mental retardation."' 1 Although the Court did
not explicitly adopt a particular definition, in a footnote it did rely on
a standard used by both the AAMR and the American Psychiatric
Association (APA).'52 AAMR's recently reformulated definition
provides that mental retardation is a "disability characterized by
significant limitations both in intellectual functioning and in adaptive
behavior as expressed in conceptual, social, and practical adaptive
147. State v. Rogers, 338 S.C. 435, 438, 527 S.E.2d 101, 103 (2000).
148. State v. Patterson, 299 S.C. 280, 286, 384 S.E.2d 699, 703 (1989), vacated
on other grounds, 493 U.S. 1013 (1990); accordMcKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S.
433, 435 (1990).
149. See State v. Hicks, 330 S.C. 207, 218, 499 S.E.2d 209, 215 (1998).
150. Jones v. State, 332 S.C. 329, 333-34 n.1, 504 S.E.2d 822, 824 n.1 (1998)
("The 'weighing' that is permissible is the considering of any mitigating and
aggravating circumstances.") (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
151. See 122 S. Ct. 2242, 2250 (2002).
152. In the 1992 version that the Atkins Court relies upon, AAMR defined
mental retardation as "substantial limitations in present functioning ... characterized
by significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, existing concurrently with related
limitations in two or more ... adaptive skill areas." Id. at 2245 n.3 (citing MENTAL
RETARDATION: DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 5 (9th ed.
1992) (emphasis added). The Court has relied on AAMR's definition in previous
cases as well. See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 308 n.1 (1989) (citing to
AAMR's definition of mental retardation); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.,
Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 442 n.9 (1985) (discussing AAMR's classification system of the
mentally retarded).
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skills."' 53 The APA's definition is similar, defining mental retardation
as "significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning ... that
is accompanied by significant limitations in adaptive functioning in at
least two ... skill areas."' 54 Both definitions require that the onset of
mental retardation manifests before age eighteen.'55
In measuring intellectual functioning, the Wechsler Adult
Intelligence Scales test (WAIS-III) is the standard instrument used
today to assess cognitive functioning.'56 The individual's IQ is scored
by "adding together the number of points earned on different subtests,
and using a mathematical formula to convert this raw score into a
scaled score."' 57 The scale ranges from 45 to 155, with a mean of 100
indicating average intellectual functioning. 5
However, determining the defendant's IQ score is only a starting
point. The second part in defining mental retardation is to ascertain
whether the individual has difficulty coping with everyday skills.1 9
The AAMR defines "adaptive behavior" as "the collection of
conceptual, social, and practical skills that people have learned so they
can function in their everyday lives," which includes reading and
writing, self-esteem, eating, dressing, taking medication, and
managing money. 6' The APA definition lists nine areas of life skills,
which include the following: "communication, self-care, home living,
social/interpersonal skills, use of community resources, self-direction,
functional academic skills, work, leisure, health, and safety."'' No
one life skill area is singularly important, and the APA provides that
a deficiency must exist in at least two of the areas.'62 Most
importantly, and consistent with the current definition in South
153. American Association on Mental Retardation, Definition of Mental
Retardation, at http://www.aamr.org/Policies/faqmental-retardation.shtml (last
updated July 29, 2002) [hereinafter AAMR, Definition]. One change in the modified
definition was to make more distinct the scope of "limitations in adaptive skill areas"
and to specify the "developmental period" age range. See Brief of American
Association on Mental Retardation et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at
14 n.18, McCarver v. North Carolina, cert. granted 532 U.S. 941 (2001), and cert.
dismissed 533 U.S. 975 (2001) (No. 00-8727).
154. Atkins, 122 S. Ct. at 2245 n.3 (citing AMERICAN PSYCHIATRICASSOCIATION,
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 41 (4th ed. 2000))
(emphasis added).
155. Id. (citations omitted).
156. Id. at 2245 n.5.
157. Id. (citing A. KAUFMAN AND E. LICHTENBERGER, ESSENTIALS OF WAISIII
ASSESSMENT 60 (1999)).
158. Id.
159. AAMR, Definition, supra note 153.
160. Id.
161. Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 2245 n.3 (2002) (citation omitted).
162. Id.
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Carolina's death penalty statute, deficient adaptive behavior must
accompany subaverage intellectual functioning.'63
Finally, to meet the definition of mentally retarded, subaverage
intellectual functioning and the concurrent inability to cope with at
least two of the above-named life skill areas must manifest before
adulthood, typically before age eighteei. 164 However, some
jurisdictions have extended the developmental period to age twenty-
two.
16 5
2. Procedural Issues
The Atkins Court did not establish any clear standards of proof or
other evidentiary issues, leaving it up to the states to develop standards
and procedures to determine who is exempt from execution, who bears
the burden of proof, at what stage the determination is to be made, and
other evidentiary issues.'6 Nothing in the Court's opinion gave any
indication of what minimum due process requirements must be
satisfied to comport with its decision, and existing specific procedural
requirements vary from state to state. The following is a discussion of
discretionary procedural areas to be resolved as a result of Atkins.
a. Who Should Determine If Retardation Exists?
In those states that currently prohibit executing the mentally
retarded, differences exist in who is to decide if the defendant is
mentally retarded. Most states provide that it is a judge who should
make the principal determination. 67 In contrast, one state, Georgia,
has left the issue as a matter properly belonging solely to a jury. 6" The
jury, acting alone, is to decide if the defendant is mentally retarded,
169
and the role of the trial judge is to provide the jury with instructions on
how to consider the issue of mental retardation. 7
Still other states provide for a variation and allow both the judge
and the jury to contribute to the determination. 7' For instance, ajudge
would initially screen to decide if mental retardation exists, but a jury
may also make an independent determination of the issue. This
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-36-9-2 (Michie 1998); MD. CODE ANN., [Criminal
Law] § 2-202(b)(ii) (2002).
166. See 122 S. Ct. 2242, 2250 (2002).
167. E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4623(a) (1995).
168. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(b)(1) (1997).
169. Id.
170. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131 (b)(3)(C) (1997).
171. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.137(6) (West 2002).
2003]
19
Shannon: Atkins v. Virginia: Commutation for the Mentally Retarded?
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54: 809
approach has been advocated by both death row inmates and capital
defense attorneys172 and would follow the traditional state practice of
allowing the judge to make the initial determinations of whether
mental retardation exists, such as is done with constitutionality of
confessions'73 and admissibility of expert testimony, 174 but then let a
jury ultimately decide the mental retardation issue. 75 However, the
South Carolina Attorney General's Office has rejected this approach,
and has instead proposed a pre-trial hearing procedure in which the
trial judge makes an independent determination of whether mental
retardation exists; therefore, the issue is never presented to a jury.176
Even if the defendant does not serve notice of a mental retardation
claim, a judge nevertheless may order, sua sponte, that a defendant
undergo mental retardation testing. '7' Analogous to other mentally-
related determinations, a trial judge has the authority, pursuant to
statutory law, to order a defendant to undergo a psychiatric
examination in order to see if the defendant is competent to stand
trial, 78 even if the defendant fails to request such an examination.
79
Finally, most states provide that, even if a judge determines that
the defendant is not mentally retarded and, thus, eligible to receive the
death penalty, the defendant is not precluded from submitting evidence
of mental retardation as a mitigating factor during the sentencing
phase. "0 However, under Atkins, a determination of retardation by
either the judge, as a pre-trial matter, or a jury would automatically
disqualify the defendant from receiving the death penalty.
Regardless of which approach garners the necessary support, a
proposed approach may have to be drafted in consideration of the
United States Supreme Court's recent decision of Ring v. Arizona. 8'
172. Brief of Petitioners at 13, 15-16, Franklin v. Maynard, No. _ . (S.C.
cert. granted Sept. 19, 2002) (on file with the Clerk of Court of the South Carolina
Supreme Court). In effect, this approach offers the defendant "two bites" in avoiding
the death penalty.
173. See State v. Davis, 309 S.C. 326, 342, 422 S.E.2d 133, 143 (1992).
174. State v. Von Dohlen, 322 S.C. 234, 248, 471 S.E.2d 689, 697 (1996).
175. Brief of Petitioner, Franklin (No. _ ).
176. Respondents Response to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8, Franklin v.
Maynard, No. _ (S.C. cert. granted Sept. 19, 2002) (on file with the Clerk of Court
for the South Carolina Supreme Court).
177. See State v. Locklair, 341 S.C. 352, 364, 535 S.E.2d 420, 426 (2000)
(stating that the defendant's mental competency to stand trial is a "baseline inquiry
by the court").
178. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-23-410 (Law. Co-op. 2002).
179. See Locklair, 341 S.C. at 364, 535 S.E.2d at 426.
180. E.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-2.1(C) (Michie 2001) (providing that a
finding of no mental retardation "shall not restrict the defendant's opportunity to
introduce such evidence at the sentencing proceeding or to argue that that evidence
should be given mitigating significance").
181. 122 S. Ct. 2428 (2002).
20
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 54, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 9
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol54/iss3/9
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Invalidating Arizona's statutory scheme, which provided that only the
judge determines the existence of aggravating factors necessary to find
the defendant death-eligible, the Ring Court held the provision as
violative of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a trial by
jury. 182 However, it may be argued that Ring's holding may not apply
when assessing a defendant's mental retardation status because Ring
applied narrowly to aggravating factors that may enhance a
defendant's sentence and not to mental status." 3 Ring also left in doubt
those statutory schemes that allow juries to issue advisory sentences
over which the trial judge has discretion to overrule."8 4
In addition to the problems that may result from Ring, practical
considerations of having a jury solely determine mental retardation
need to be considered. For instance, what effect will "bad" evidence
have on juries that must decide whether a defendant is mentally
retarded and, therefore, not deserving to die for his or her crime?"8 5
Out of an urge to punish, a jury may ignore credible evidence of the
defendant's mental state and find the defendant eligible for the death
penalty. Further, additional constitutional strictures required by capital
trials, such as expanded voir dire,'8 6 may be easily avoided if the issue
is never presented to a jury. For instance, courts may find it necessary
to extend voir dire in order to allow a capital defendant to strike
prospective jurors who do not believe mental retardation should
preclude imposition of the death penalty.
Despite statutes that direct a judge to make the determination,
most states also employ a statutory mitigation approach.' For
instance, even though a judge finds that the defendant is not mentally
retarded, a defendant may still introduce evidence of his diminished
intellectual functioning and offer it for consideration as a mitigating
factor against the death penalty. 88 In light of case law requiring the
jury to consider all relevant mitigating factors,18 9 a state may be
182. Id. at 2443.
183. Id.
184. Id. n.6.
185. See generally William J. Bowers et al., Foreclosed Impartiality in Capital
Sentencing: Jurors 'Predispositions, Guilt-Trial Experience, and Premature Decision
Making, 83 CORNELLL. REV. 1476, 1477 (1998) (referring to interviews of 916 capital
jurors who admitted to deciding punishment before the sentencing phase ended).
186. See, e.g., Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36-37 (1986) (requiring states to
permit voir dire regarding racial prejudice in capital cases involving interracial
crimes).
187. E.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-703.01(G) (West 2002).
188. E.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-2.1(C) (Michie 2001) (providing that a
finding of no mental retardation "shall not restrict the defendant's opportunity to
introduce such evidence at the sentencing proceeding or to argue that that evidence
should be given mitigating significance").
189. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978).
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obliged to allow a jury to consider the evidentiary support of mental
retardation regardless of any statutory language providing otherwise.
b. When Is the Determination to Be Made?
Another crucial issue concerns at what stage of the proceedings
the decision of mental retardation is to be made, thereby precluding
imposition of the death penalty. This procedure would differ
depending on who makes the determination. Assuming the decision is
to be made by a judge who is not also acting as the trier of fact, the
determination may be made at one of three different stages of the trial.
First, ajudge may decide if mental retardation exists as a pretrial
matter considered with other motions submitted by the attorneys. In
those states that provide for a pure judicial determination of the
defendant's mental retardation status, most provide that the decision
is a pre-trial issue for the judge.19
Second, several states provide that the trial judge must specify
whether the defendant is mentally retarded at a pre-sentencing
hearing.19' Under this approach, once a jury has rendered a guilty
verdict, but before the sentencing phase begins, the defense may
submit a motion raising an Atkins issue. The judge decides the mental
retardation claim after both parties have rested their cases. Each case-
in-chief would include the presentation of expert testimony in support
of or in rebuttal to the claim. If the judge determines that the defendant
is in fact mentally retarded, then the state must remove the death
penalty from consideration. Finally, a few states provide that the
determination is made by the trial court during the sentencing phase
of the trial.
192
If it is a jury who is to make the determination, resolution of the
claim may also occur in one of three ways. First, a separate jury may
be impaneled (before or after the guilt phase) to determine only the
issue of mental retardation. No facts of the case, or heinous nature of
the crime, may be presented so as to prevent the jury from ignoring the
merits of the defendant's claim and deciding the case solely on
prejudicial feelings toward the defendant. The issue is to be
determined solely by the jury with the trial judge only acting as a
gatekeeper in regard to the admissibility of relevant evidence and
expert testimony. However, prosecutors are likely to disfavor any
exclusion of the facts because it may limit them from showing how
190. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-9-402(1) (West 2001).
191. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4623(a) and (b) (1994); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 28-105.01(5) (Michie 1998); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-2.1(C) (Michie 2001).
192. E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-618(d)(2) (Michie 1987); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 53a-46a(h)(2) (West 2001).
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detailed the planning aspects of the crime are to rebut the defendant's
claim of mental impairment. Further, the option of two separate
juries-one to determine if the defendant is mentally retarded and one
to decide guilt or innocence-may not be practical given the
inefficiency and lack of judicial economy that is perpetuated if the
same set of facts must be presented on two separate occasions.
Further, due process concerns may be implicated in cases where a
defendant wishes to present evidence of mental retardation to show
that he or she was incapable of forming the requisite mens rea of the
crime charged.193
A second option in cases of jury determinations is to allow the
jury to decide if mental retardation exists as a special form of the
verdict. For instance, Georgia law provides for a separate "guilty but
mentally retarded" verdict option for the jury to consider during the
guilt or innocence phase.1
94
Another alternative approach is to have the jury consider the issue
during deliberations in the sentencing phase. Florida law provides that
a jury may issue an advisory sentence of death that the judge may or
may not accept, 95 although this approach may not be valid after the
Court's decision in Ring v. Arizona 96 Finally, nothing should
preclude statutory language that permits a defendant to elect to have
ajudge, instead of ajury, decide the issue upon written agreement by
the parties and with the court's permission.
In adopting either approach, a related issue concerns at what point
a defendant is precluded from raising an Atkins claim. Due process
concerns may require a flexible approach, such as when a defendant
has recently been appointed defense counsel and the counsel does not
know the defendant well enough to make a valid claim. However,
analogous to the insanity procedures discussed in Ford v.
Wainwright,97 a state may be allowed to impose reasonable time
limits for raising a claim of mental retardation.
c. Who Bears the Burden of Prooj?
Another issue left open to the states is which party should bear the
burden of proving a mental retardation claim. Similar to the issues of
193. See, e.g., State v. Cowan, 861 P.2d 884, 888 (Mont. 1993) (providing by
statute that such evidence is admissible).
194. GA. CODEANN. § 17-7-131(b)(1)(E) (1997).
195. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.137(4), (5) (West 2002).
196. 122 S. Ct. 2428 (2002).
197. See 477 U.S. 399, 417 (noting that "legitimate pragmatic considerations
may also supply the boundaries of the procedural safeguards that feasibly can be
provided").
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sanity 98 and competency,199 the state should not be required to prove
that the defendant did not suffer from mental retardation; in other
words, mental retardation should not be presumed. One approach is to
allow for a rebuttable presumption of mental retardation when the
defendant has tested at a certain threshold level of intellectual
functioning as measured by an IQ test.2"' For example, if the defendant
scores a seventy on an IQ test, then the burden would shift to the
prosecution to show that the defendant is not mentally retarded. This
approach is similar to South Carolina's incompetency procedure
whereby, once the defendant is found incompetent, the burden shifts
to the prosecution to show that the defendant has been restored to
competency.20'
d. What Is the Proper Standard of Proof?
The majority of states that have already prohibited the execution
of the mentally retarded require that mental retardation be shown by
a preponderance of the evidence.202 Five states have adopted a clear
and convincing standard,03 while only one state uses the more
stringent, beyond a reasonable doubt standard.20 4 In a similar manner,
South Carolina law provides that the defendant must show that he or
she was either mentally ill205 or incompetent by a preponderance of the
evidence.0 6
198. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-10(B) (Law Co-op. 2001).
199. See Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 452 (1992); State v. Reed, 332
S.C. 35, 39, 503 S.E.2d 747, 749 (1998).
200. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-618(a)(2) (Michie 1987) (treating an IQ
of sixty-five or below as a rebuttable presumption of mental retardation).
201. State v. Singleton, 313 S.C. 75, 87, 437 S.E.2d 53, 60 (1993).
202. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-203(c) (1997) (providing that the
burden of proof is on the defendant to prove mental retardation by a preponderance
of the evidence).
203. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703.02(G) (West 2002); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 35-36-9-4(b) (Michie 1998); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-1.3-1102 (West 2002);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.137(4) (West 2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2005(C) (2001).
204. See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(c)(3) (1997); see also Williams v. State,
455 S.E.2d 836, 838 (Ga. 1995) (refusing to invalidate the "beyond a reasonable
doubt" standard as violative of due process).
205. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-20(B) (Law Co-op. 2001).
206. State v. Nance, 320 S.C. 501, 504, 466 S.E.2d 349, 351 (1996); see also
Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 369 (1996) (concluding that requiring the
defendant to prove incompetence by clear and convincing evidence violates due
process).
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V. RESPONSE AFTER A TKINS
A. Proposal
First of all, the state legislature and not the courts should be the
proper venue for change, although resolution of the practical
implications of the Court's decision will take place in both the
legislatures and courtrooms. However, in crafting a response to Atkins,
the state legislatures and courts should not cut constitutional comers
by erecting procedural barriers to circumvent compliance with the
Atkins mandate that the capital punishment of the mentally retarded is
barred. However, assurances should also be enacted to guard against
clearly frivolous claims. One possible approach to counteract
unmerited claims is to treat the defendant as waiving a sua sponte
judicial inquiry into his mental retardation if he attempts to pursue a
clearly frivolous retardation claim.
Following a rigorous pre-trial hearing, it should be the duty of the
trial judge to act as the gatekeeper of expert testimony and as the
determining authority of whether the defendant is mentally retarded.
Similar tojudicial authority concerning competency determinations,2 7
a judge should be the sole decision-maker as to whether the issue of
the existence of mental retardation raises to such a level as to preclude
consideration of the death penalty by the trier of fact. Although Ring
v. Arizona held that it is a jury (or a judge if he or she is acting as the
trier of fact) that must find the facts necessary to determine if a
defendant is death-eligible,2 8 examining a defendant's mental state is
more similar to interpretations used in categorical exclusions, such as
incompetency, in which the court makes the determination.2 9 In
addition, the promotion ofjudicial economy and the potential for jury
bias lend support toward only the judge making the determination.
This approach guards against an impassionedjury's arbitrary findings.
Further, if the judge makes the ultimate decision at the outset of the
trial that the defendant is mentally retarded, thereby negating the death
penalty option, the additional constitutional strictures of a capital trial
are avoided. Based on the foregoing reasons, the judge is better able
to render an appropriate determination of a defendant's mental
retardation status. Even if a jury has the sole power to assess the
defendant's mental retardation, a judge should possess the discretion
207. A judge has sole authority to determine if the defendant is competent to
stand trial. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-23-410 (Law Co-op. 1976).
208. 122 S. Ct. 2428 (2002).
209. See also Harris v. United States, 122 S. Ct. 2406, 2410 (2002) (remarking
that "not all facts affecting the defendant's punishment are elements" of the crime).
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to raise the defendant's mental status in absence of the defense
counsel's failure to do so.
210
The burden of proof is upon the State to prove that the defendant
is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. However, the burden of proving
the existence of mental retardation should be upon the defendant to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she was mentally
retarded, as defined in the statute, at the time he or she committed the
crime. Further, it should be presumed that the defendant did not suffer
from mental retardation. This standard is favored in a pronounced
number of jurisdictions2" and is in accord with other mental status
determinations, such as insanity,22 mental illness," 3  and
competency.214 However, if the defendant fails to prove retardation by
the appropriate standard, nothing should preclude the defendant from
submitting his mental state as a mitigating circumstance to be
considered by the jury during its deliberations.
B. South Carolina House Bill 3165
On December 9, 2002, several members of the South Carolina
House of Representatives pre-filed House Bill 3165, a bill that would,
among other things, prohibit the execution of the mentally retarded
and establish certain procedures for responding to Atkins claims.215
Specifically, the bill would require a defendant to prove the existence
of mental retardation by clear and convincing evidence.2 1" The
determination would be made by a judge at a pre-trial hearing upon
the defendant's own motion.217 The bill retains the definition of
"mental retardation" as provided in the current death penalty statute,
but defines diminished intellectual functioning as "an intelligence
quotient of seventy or below," which appears to establish a non-
rebuttable presumption of mental retardation.2 8
If the defendant is found to suffer from mental retardation, upon
conviction he or she would be sentenced to life imprisonment.219
210. See State v. Locklair, 341 S.C. 352, 364, 535 S.E. 2d 420, 426 (2000).
211. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-203(c)(1997) (providing that the
"burden of production and persuasion to demonstrate mental retardation ... is upon
the defendant").
212. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-10(B) (Law Co-op. 2001).
213. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-20(B) (Law Co-op. 2001).
214. 320 S.C. 501, 504, 466 S.E.2d 349, 351 (1996).
215. H.R. 3165, Gen. Assem., 115th Sess. (S.C. 2003),
http://www.scstatehouse.net/sess 115_2003-2004/bills/3165.htm.
216. Id. The "clear and convincing" standard provided for in the bill's language
may pose constitutional problems as discussed above. See supra note 206.
217. H.R. 3165.
218. Id. (emphasis added).
219. Id.
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However, if the judge finds that the defendant is not mentally retarded,
the defendant may nevertheless present evidence of "diminished
capacity" as a mitigating factor during sentencing.22° The bill's
language is likely to change substantially as it moves through the
political process.
VI. CONCLUSION
The categorical exemption from the death penalty that the United
States Supreme Court created in Atkins forms a new substantive
constitutional guarantee that is likely to be litigated and refined in the
courts for years to come. The South Carolina courts should not
intervene in establishing any new substantive guidelines, particularly
with respect to cases that have not been litigated, until the legislature
has acted. However, this approach may already be defeated because
the South Carolina Supreme Court recently granted certiorari to
review pending and litigated cases involving Atkins claims.
Notwithstanding the court's response, the South Carolina General
Assembly must quickly take adequate steps to secure compliance with
the constitutional strictures of Atkins, while simultaneously ensuring
that potential capital defendants cannot manipulate the criminal justice
and mental health processes. Any legislation enacted will most likely
be challenged in the courts. When that occurs, South Carolina courts
should defer to the legislature and refrain from an ad hoc approach in
creating constitutional patches to a death penalty scheme that attempts
to balance the needs of the criminal justice system with a defendant's
constitutional right to a fair trial. Despite this interaction, the federal
courts will have the final word in deciding the application and scope
of the Atkins holding and in ensuring that the class of individuals
eligible for the death penalty is sufficiently narrowed in order to
comply with the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Atkins.
Other important issues, such as the effect of Atkins on retroactivity
analysis, ex post facto concerns, post-conviction procedures, and
habeas corpus issues, do not fall within the purview of this Comment,
but will need to be addressed by the legislature, the courts, and
constitutional commentators.
Sue Ann Gerald Shannon
220. Id. Although South Carolina does not recognize the doctrine of
"diminished capacity," see Gill v. State, 346 S.C. 209,220,552 S.E.2d 26,32(2001),
the bill would allow the jury to consider whether the defendant had the capacity "to
appreciate the criminality of his conduct" or whether he was unable "to conform his
conduct to the requirements of law." H.R. 3165.
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Communities have sought other ways to control land uses, and in
Nollan v. California Coastal Commision" the Court held that, for a
conditional building permit to be valid, an "essential nexus" must exist
between the condition placed upon the permit and the valid public purpose
sought by the condition.45 More recently, the Court returned to this issue of
conditional permits in Dolan v. City of Tigard.6 In Dolan the Court had no
problem finding the essential nexus between the condition and the public
purpose involved in the case;47 however, a taking was found based on the
conclusion that the exactions placed on the landowner did not bear a "rough
proportionality" to the impact of the proposed development on the public.4
In Palazzolo v. Rhode Island49 the Court expressly stated, for the first
time, that a takings claim may exist even if the landowner has acquired the
property after the given regulation is effective."0 In Palazzolo the landowner
claimed that a restriction on development on or near wetlands passed prior
to his purchase of the land effected a taking under the Lucas per se
exception for the permanent deprivation of all economically viable use of
the land.5' However, no taking was found because, unlike in Lucas, the land
retained some developmental value despite the restriction. 2
In 2002, the Court refused to apply the categorical rule established in
Lucas that any permanent regulation depriving a landowner of all
economically viable use constitutes a taking. 3 In Tahoe-Sierra Preservation
Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, the Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency enacted two moratoria effecting a thirty-two-month ban on
development in order to allow time for the study and creation of a
comprehensive land use plan.54 Instead, the Court applied the Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York City analysis" and upheld the moratoria
because the group challenging them failed to make a claim that they were
unconstitutional under the Penn Central test."
44. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
45. Id. at 837.
46. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
47. Id. at 387.
48. Id. at 391,395.
49. 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
50. Id. at 632.
51. Id. at 615-16.
52. Id. at 616.
53. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct. 1465
(2002).
54. Id. at 1489.
55. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
56. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc., 122 S. Ct. at 1489.
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